From the Sahel to Gabon, Francafrique is shaking.
Goita in Mali, Traoré in Burkina Faso, and Niger's military junta successfully managed to slip away from Paris control within a matter of weeks from their takeover. In 2 and a half years, France lost a key portion of its African assets in an area mired by major failures in French military involvement in recent times, especially in the fight against Jihadist militias. Just last August in Mali, France's "Operation Barkhane" failed, with Bamako's administration cooperating with Russia to repel French influence. Likewise, in the Central African Republic, Russia, thanks to Africa Corps (formerly Wagner PMC), has established itself as the support leg of the central government in the ongoing civil war, which has been tearing apart the country for the last twelve years. In addition to this, after last year's election, Gabon's President Ali Bongo Ondimba was removed by his Generals in a Russian-backed coup d’état, ending a dynasty supported by France since his father, Omar Bongo, took over in 1967 with French political support. From this chaos and instability arising in Francafrique, Moscow and Beijing's influence in the region is growing, as the centuries-long French colonial hand is fading away. However, Paris hopes to turn the tables again. With few pieces left on the board for Paris to play with, each remaining aligned regime becomes more important, and the next one most likely to falter is in Yaoundé, Cameroon, where the longest-living French ally in Africa will soon pass away.
The 6th of November marked Paul Biya's regime's 42nd anniversary since his 1982 coup d’état against another significant figure in Cameroon's history, Ahamadou Ahidjo, the leader of the independence process. A Muslim from the North, Ahidjo established himself as the head of both the country and the Cameroonian National Unity (CNU), the only legal political party. In 1982, a power transition saw Biya, a Catholic from the south and already prime minister, becoming President in what was intended to be a symbolic position. Ahidjo intended to keep the CNU, of whom he stayed leader, as the State's vital organ, maintaining real power in his hands. Tension arose between the two, leading to the failed coup of 1984. Biya repressed the rebels and definitively solidified his power, dismissing the CNU in favor of the newly founded Cameroonian People Democratic Movement (CPDM), transforming the country's system into today's president-centered authoritarian regime.
The role of President Biya is pivotal; he has control of all the powers across the country. He holds the executive directly in his hands, has a decisive role in the process of formation and approval of laws, and also controls the judiciary institutions in a national organization closer to an administration per requetè rather than a modern state of law. All of this was worsened by Biya's continuous periods of absence from the country, given his known habit of spending long periods of time abroad between France and Switzerland, which worsened the already inefficient situation of the country's institutions.
The popular sentiment around Biya's rise to power resulted in him being seen as a secular messianic figure to many Cameroonians; however, after more than four decades of presidency, this sentiment has largely faded. His reign marked some notable accomplishments in Cameroonian development, such as the literacy rate rising from 41.2% to 78.23% thanks to education reforms, which led to Universities opening in every region in the country, not only in the capital region of Yaoundé. However, the opposition, particularly people of the Cameroonian diaspora and members of the civil society, view Biya as having wasted an opportunity. An HDI score of 0,587 put Cameroon at the 153rd position of the global ranking, in a situation of massive underdevelopment. Corruption and nepotism are rampant; the Transparency Index puts Cameroon at 140th out of the 180 countries registered, with about 10 million people out of a total population of 27 million living under the line of absolute poverty.
Given Biya's old age and worsening health, change is imminent; there is no clear path to a smooth succession, and with the election set up for 2025, the power transition in Yaoundé leaves a question mark. In the era of decolonization, the now 91-year-old President chose to pursue his predecessor's strategy, keeping strong ties with Paris, even in a climate of intense growing adversity towards the former colonial occupier. As a result, France has remained the long arm behind Cameroon's regime, maintaining stability and thus having a fundamental influence on the economic and political levels. Despite President Macron's apparent mandate shift towards the former colonies, best demonstrated by his 2017 speech at Ouagadougou's Burkina Faso State University, where he stated, "There is no French policy for Africa because Franquafrique no longer exists."), things have not changed. Financial control is established through the CFA-based currency system and the protection of French companies involved in the country. Two significant examples of these companies are Eramet, which is dominant in the mining sector, as it is in neighboring countries like Gabon and is a key company in the management of Cameroon's plan of resources extraction, and Perenco, a company essential in Cameroonian oil production. The exports from Cameroon to France are currently worth around 1 billion USD, while the imports from France sit at around 650 million USD, making France the country's leading trade partner along with China. As of late 2019, half of Cameroon's financial reserves were kept in the French state treasury; in turn, the French supported Biya when dealing with the country's internal problems and threats to their stability and territorial integrity. Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest regions are the main theater of the conflict between separatists and the central government and, not so coincidentally, the most wealthy of the country resource-wise. Thus, an integral part of Cameroon's dire economic situation inevitably stems from the dispute between the fighters and Yaoundé, an issue that many foreign interests wish to end in favor of one side or another.
Ethnically, the majority of the Cameroonian population is composed of people from the Beti and Bulu groups situated in the southern francophone regions. In the north and northwest, in what had been German Cameroon (Grassland) until the end of the First World War, the prevalent group is the Bamileke Anglophones, predominantly from the Ambazonia region. Religion-wise, while Christians make up 65% percent of the total population in the deep north, people of Fulani origin represent a regional Muslim majority, which is far less of a problem than it is in neighboring countries like Nigeria. Ethnic tribalism in Cameroon is almost a non-existent factor in the people's social life, but it is poised to play a role in the balance and power struggles of the nation after 42 years of status quo.
The Francophones have institutionally been the dominant group both culturally, politically, and economically throughout Biya's regime, betraying the promises of equal treatment upon which the country united in 1961 when the regions that gained independence from the British under the name of West Cameroon merged with the former French part. The Anglophones have slowly become oppressed in their own country, and their numerous attempts for a peaceful change have been harshly repressed by Biya's regime, most notably in 2015 and 2016. Protests of teachers, lawyers, and judicial functionaries demanding the use of English as the official language of their regions were brutally crushed by the army.
Another example of the sectarian issue Cameroon faces is the quest for independence of the self-proclaimed Ambazonia Republic, which has been a thorn in the side of Biya's regime since 1985, when the opposition leader Gorij Dinka circulated a pamphlet calling for separation and independence, before being jailed and then exiled abroad in both Nigeria and the UK. The continuous worsening of the region's situation, with fights erupting between Yaoundé's authority and rebels, has brought the country to the brink of a civil war. The Anglophone crisis has created 765.000 refugees and 6.000 casualties, with the rebels and the legitimate army forces engaged in numerous atrocities throughout Cameroon across the last 30 years. The Ambazonian insurgents were able to impose a liberation tax on the region's inhabitants and crush internal resistance to the harshest way against central power while simultaneously fighting for independence. A vital question mark lies in the current nature of the Ambazonian movement, whose head is operating from abroad, where its most important military commander, Ayaba Cho, has been recently arrested in Norway in the context of a cooperation agreement between Oslo and Yaoundé, and what they want to obtain in the arm wrestle with the Central government.
Despite the apparent weakness of the decaying government, it has been able to successfully counter other threats to the country's stability over the last few years, such as Islamic terrorism, which plague neighboring countries, from Boko Haram in Nigeria to eastern Ciad jihadis. These groups have been efficiently limited alongside the Ambazonian separatists, who do not have the strength and resources needed to arrive at independence.
The risk of a Biafran-type situation seems much less likely looking at the engagement and support of foreign investors, with new partners outside of France, such as China, trying to enter the market and replacing the French by buying and investing in the nation's natural resources and extraction infrastructure. Russia is also highly active in Africa through the former Wagner Group PMC, now rebranded Africa Corps, and is actively expanding its influence in what represents a key strategic position in the region. Despite Biya's support of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, remarked with his presence at the last Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg, the recently expanded military cooperation deals between Moscow and Yaoundé do not mention a direct Russian involvement either in the fight with Jihadis, with whom Wagnerites are involved in other areas of the former Francafrique such as the Sahel region, or the Ambazonian separatists. Despite these agreements with Putin's regime, Biya has not renounced French and Western support, keeping the fil rouge intense throughout his era and closely tied to Paris and its political establishment. While France is beginning to lose control over Cameroon through widespread social hostility from Cameroonians, French political influence is still strong and remarkable, and France's role in Biya's succession cannot be underestimated. Russia's role has not been nearly as fundamental for the governing class in keeping its power as in other dysfunctional African countries such as the Sahel's Juntas or Mozambique. The presence of a system that has not crumbled under its President's decaying conditions but has been able to walk on its feet, even partially while losing its head, avoided a collapse of institutions that could have brought to a Libyan/CAR-type situation where Moscow's entry in the country would have been indeed more manageable and more profitable than it had been so far. The bicephalous eagle is at the window, waiting for a moment to decisively influence Cameroon's future, but the more stable the answer to the power transition question will be, the less likely a Russian intervention or decisive role in its formation will take place.
On the other hand, China's role is fundamental in whatever scenario kicks in after Biya's death. Chinese diplomacy has been wonderfully able to adapt to the most various situations in Africa at every latitude, from Algeria to Cape Town, and in Cameroon, Beijing's influence has grown decisively even during Biya's era. Commercial trade between China and Cameroon is currently worth 3.17 billion dollars in exports from Beijing to Yaoundé and 571 million import-wise, a number which is doomed to arise in the coming years, given the newly signed cooperation deal by the country's Finance Minister Motazé and its Chinese counterpart, which aims to "eliminate double taxation on income and prevent tax evasion and avoidance." As already stated, China is winning the economic challenge in Africa, and Cameroon is no exception. It already is the largest creditor of Cameroonian external public debt, owning 61% of it, loaning more than 6.5 billion dollars for the construction of various key projects in Cameroonian development like the Kribi's port, the biggest of Central Africa at its future conclusion, commissioned through the Chinese Harboring Engineering Corporation (CHEC). Beijing is proposing to be the new player of influence in Africa and is doing so successfully. Being effectively far more efficient and appealing and exploiting the mass hostile sentiment toward the former colonial powers, China is taking over the Black Continent through what many have pointed out is a "trap-debt" strategy, where the countries helped with the infrastructure building projects remain unable to pay back the massive loans, leading to terrible collateral effects, even default in a case like Zambia's one.
France's shot at keeping Yaoundé under its wing must then be strategically focused towards its roots and ties within Cameroonian history, leaving aside the economic battleground and the number 37 of Quai d'Orsay has been moving forward to it in the last years, paving the way for a take over of Biya's legacy. Paris paths lead to Maurice Kamto, leader of the Cameroonian Renaissance Movement (CRM), head of the democratic opposition, and Patrick Biya, Paul's son. Kamto, already a minister of justice under the current President from 2004 to 2011, has strongly advocated against Biya's regime since then, claiming victory in the 2018 elections and getting arrested the year later in Douala, being freed nine months later. Civil society skepticism around Kamto is high, given how a democratic change, as unlikely as it remains, could be used by France as a move to gain the momentum necessary for the construction of another solid, reliable allied regime. Establishing a president in charge who is de jure expression of popular will while the facto ties with Paris remain strong as they have been for the last 40 years could be vital for French ambition over the region in a situation where all its surrounding assets, from Senegal to Cote D'Ivoire, are risking of getting dethroned and the hostility towards European presence is at an all-time high.
Parallelly, Frank Biya's figure quotations are getting higher and higher. For many years, he was politically in the shadows, being accused by various activist groups of illicit activities throughout his business career, mainly during the saving of the state company Camtel in 2005, when with one of his companies, he allegedly bought the telematic State-owned operator debt securities and then sold them at a higher price in 2006 to the central government, profiting off of it. Recently, Frank has been more and more present in Cameroonian public life, and he was the one directly welcoming President Emmanuel Macron during his state visit in July of 2022. Moreover, for Paris, he would be the perfect follow-up to his father, seen as a solution preferred by the Biya Loyalist-led Armed Forces. The increase in his political life involvement, for example, through his participation at the China-Africa summit this year, could point to a very likely presence of the President's son in the upcoming 2025 elections. However, if this scenario worked fine in Ciad, where Idrissa Deby's son is currently in charge, a similar regime was brought down in Gabon's 2023 coup’état. Plus, it is doubtful that having another Biya in power would not bring a wave of chaos, protests, and fights across the country. Millions of Cameroonians strive for a change after 42 years of dictatorship, and a continuation of the regime through the President's son would probably ignite once again the tension with the Ambazonians, risking destroying the peace talk progress and compromising the fragile balance where the country lays, worsening the humanitarian and economic situation. Yaoundé could potentially simultaneously represent France's last bastion of African ambitions or China's checkmate to hundreds of years of colonial influence and power in the chessboard of what, despite Macron's claim, is for now still Francafrique territory.
