Otto Von Bismarck supposedly exclaimed in 1878, “Europe today is a powder keg and the leaders are like men smoking in an arsenal … A single spark will set off an explosion that will consume us all … I cannot tell you when that explosion will occur, but I can tell you where … Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans will set it off.”. His prediction would come to fruition only a few decades later with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the start of World War I.
The Balkan region has historically been beset by conflict and division with opposing empires dating back over a thousand years. Most recently, the Yugoslav Wars of the 90s - a set of conflicts so violent and shrouded in ethnic rivalry that its generational scars are fresh on the minds of even the youngest in the region.
Now, the potential for a new Balkan war is looming. The war in Ukraine, declining US influence, and a global shift towards multipolarity, has once again placed the region firmly into a potential frontline of conflicting ambition between East and West; most recently indicated by the visit of Chinese President Xi to Serbia where he affirmed a “shared future” for the two nations. This, combined with the potent staying power of historical rivalries and a global increase in nationalism and rearmament, once again makes the Balkans a potential flashpoint in the soft underbelly of a Europe already embroiled in supporting a losing war against Russia.
However, accession into the EU could present a unique opportunity for preventing a regional conflict. Via frictionless borders, equalising economic development & integration, acting as a quasi-Yugoslavia, the EU could be the beacon of hope that the Balkans has been yearning for. If not, Europe could inevitably see a pull of Serbia ever closer to the Russo-Chinese BRICS sphere of influence, becoming another example of lack of EU foresight and proactiveness on the global stage, and plunging it into further disarray in a world of declining Western influence.
Geocapita analysts, Joseph Moulton and Adam Amer, have recently been on the ground in the Balkans to gain a better understanding and provide an authentic human solution to the potential conflict.
The Yugoslav wars saw a unified prosperous socialist nation, with a GDP higher than that of Italy, Spain and Greece, dissolve and embroil into a prolonged conflict of galvanised historical hatred, on a scale Europe hadn’t seen since the Second World War.
Yugoslavia had always been an anomaly in Europe. Socialist, yet neither aligned with East or West; a new nation, with a new identity and a strong vision for the future and a founding member of the international Non-Aligned Movement, an organization whose members and goals closely resemble a diluted version of BRICS. This gave Yugoslavia a unique role in Europe: no longer was the Yugoslav region an economically underdeveloped victim of imperialism, but rather a global diplomatic player and regional power with a highly effective intelligence agency.
With the death of Tito and the subsequent Yugoslav wars, clear lines were drawn between the constituent ethno-religious states which spawned from its dissolution. The Serbs, historic allies of Russia, received little support in the conflict from the East which was still in turmoil following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile the now internationally dominant EU and NATO generally supported the anti-Serb forces in varying capacities, culminating in the NATO bombing of the then almost entirely Serb Yugoslavia and the secession of the new state of Kosovo. These actions disillusioned the Serbian people with the idea of participating in a NATO led Europe and diplomatically isolated them in the post-soviet European order. This great transgression is in the mind of every Serb, creating an almost universal anti-NATO culture; one which has become stronger than ever in light of declining global NATO strength.
The war in Ukraine has marked the decline of uncontested global NATO power and the rising strength of non-NATO aligned nations. Culturally, this has sent shockwaves around the globe, leading anti-NATO factions globally to hope for revenge or redemption in light of perceived NATO backed injustice. The cracks are beginning to show: nations across the world are moving towards China and BRICS alignment and the Balkans is no different.
Whilst the government is generally pro-EU under Vučić, Serbs continue to feel wronged by the collective West. The recent UN declaration of Srebrenica as a genocide perpetrated by the Serbs against the Bosniaks has firmly reminded them that they are still perceived as the “villain” of the Balkans and has pushed Republika Srpska, the ethnic Serb autonomous republic in Bosnia, to begin preparations to secede. The decision throws the fragile NATO and EU enforced peace into jeopardy. Notably, a decision which China, Russia and other BRICS aligned nations voted against, something which Serbian president Vučić called for, a clear display of solidarity and support for Serbia.
The relations between Serbia, China and Russia have only increased recently, with Xi visiting Serbia and affirming their role as a key player in a “shared future”, tied heavily to the belt and road initiative. This could see a shift from the previous “Janus-faced” foreign policy of Serbia between the EU and Russia into one of Serbian alignment firmly placed in the East. A sentiment we found was prevalent among the younger and older generations alike, who feel disenfranchised by the EU’s lukewarm approach to diplomacy with Serbia, categorised by pushing historical guilt on the Serbian people while still economically engaging in the Serbian economy.
This poses a significant risk to the stability of Europe in a region which is largely militarised and has no shortage of local militias and volunteers to supplement. A conflict in Bosnia and Serbia would place another war on the borders of the EU, one which would inevitably be exploited by the NATO opposed powers and further throw into question NATO military and diplomatic hegemony. It would also mean the EU would lose another strategic military partner in Serbia, which is indirectly supplying weapons to Ukraine: an estimated 800 million USD worth, during a time of a relative global arms and munitions shortage.
Both Bosnia and Serbia produce various calibres of artillery shells, of which there is a huge global shortage and order backlogs due to the conflict in Ukraine. To lose out on this immediate manufacturing capability would be a significant blow for the EU’s continual support of a struggling and undersupplied Ukraine. Furthermore, Europe would further lose out on access to historical and newfound natural resource deposits in Bosnia and Serbia. In November 2023, one of the largest lithium deposits in Europe was found in eastern Bosnia, a vital mineral in an increasingly lithium dependent Europe.
Should Bosnia become a battleground once more, Europe would lose out on the potential for higher domestic resource dependency in the context of an increasingly hostile global trade environment; not to mention oil and agricultural exports which are all the more necessary in the context of declining Ukrainian agricultural exports and global oil sanctions.
Something which our analysts picked up on the ground across the former Yugoslav nations was the desire to join the EU. Across the political spectrum in the region, joining the EU is seen as the pinnacle of economic opportunity. The economic incentives of the EU far outweigh the ideological differences and drawbacks. Despite polls claiming that Serbs are more Eurosceptic than ever, private conversations with key Serbian politicians and thinkers across the political spectrum indicate a support to join the EU, should they become less critical of Serbian actions in the Yugoslav war. This is a sentiment which is shared across most of the anti-EU Serbs.
The EU is a complex governing bloc that at its core promotes: Peace & Stability, Economic Prosperity and European Cohesion. The bloc also has experience in integrating post-conflict nations (Croatia, Slovenia and Czech Republic), vital for integrating the Balkan states. Recently the EU has been trying to spread its wings in being a pivotal geopolitical player separate from the NATO party line; this has been seen principally in the rhetoric of France and Macron, particularly towards Armenia, which has been in a state of proxy war with NATO ally Turkey via Azerbaijan.
Being decisive - by absorbing the Balkan states, preventing a new European conflict and denying potential Russian and Chinese allies - could be the launchpad that the EU sorely needs to demonstrate its own power projection, whilst also meeting its own economic needs. The collective population of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo is just under 15 million, plenty to meet the EU’s human capital easing targets and thus relying less on non-EU immigrants – aligning well with internal state policies on immigration.
The EU has a mass array of governing apparatus that all works in conjunction to aid the prosperity of its young member states. These include: Monetary union (Euro), Structural funds (ERDF and ESF), Single Market, Common Agricultural Policy and Capacity Building via TAIEX. However, the most beneficial of EU membership for Balkan peace would be the frictionless borders via EU Freedom of Movement.
A recurring theme when speaking to residents of former Yugoslavia is the feeling of physical and cultural division from their neighbours. Crossing the Montenegro – Croatia border can take in excess of 3 hours, a problem that did not exist in Yugoslavia. EU frictionless borders would instantly rectify this problem. Whilst this may seem like a minor inconvenience, the implications are much more far-reaching, such as inhibiting inter-Balkan trade and furthering the social and cultural divide between neighbourly EU/ Non-EU nations.
The benefits of EU frictionless borders would thus change the Balkan status quo by:
- Increasing trade between current and newly admitted EU Balkan states;
- Increasing social and cultural cooperation thus reducing historical tensions;
- Reducing the developmental gap between EU and non-EU Balkan states;
- Resolving the Republika Srpksa / Federacija issue in Bosnia, and helping to fully federalise Bosnia within the EU cooperative framework.
- Aiding the Kosovo-Serbia issue by reducing national fervour and reducing the implication of Kosovo independence.
- Adherence to Common EU law and trade frameworks.
In essence, freedom of movement within the Balkans would help recreate a
quasi-Yugoslavia and help replicate the unity once felt at the heart of the Yugoslavian social contract. Additionally, the ability to keep symbolic national independence would eliminate the errors under Tito; specifically, the strict suppression on national ideals and identity.
Through accepting all the former Yugoslav nations into the EU in one single secession, these issues can be dissolved almost overnight and provide the framework for the healing of ethnic and religious tensions, while also preventing the increase of non-NATO aligned influence in Europe.
While this solution may seem idealistic, the post-Yugoslav Balkans was the Wild West of Europe, where laws were seen more as recommendations and a small handful of dollars could get you anything. It would seem that taming the Balkans even under the guidance of the EU would be hard if not impossible. However, it has already been done, multiple times and very successfully. Croatia is the shining example of Balkan integration into the EU. In 2013, Croatia was admitted into the EU, including both the Eurozone and Schengen area. At the time only 23% of Croatian nationals believed that EU membership would be of any benefit to them; exactly a decade later that number has more than doubled to 52%.Croatia was a Eurosceptic nation that held extreme national fervour even after the death of their wartime and founding leader, Franjo Tudjman. Croatia also had major border and land disputes with its EU neighbour Slovenia, specifically on the Gulf of Piran and the Mura River. The EU commission saw this a legitimate risk factor to its Slovenian member and decided to defuse the tension by allowing access to Croatia and sharing fishing rights on the Gulf of Piran among Slovenia and Croatia.
Additionally, the EU managed to underpin and reinforce Croatia’s fragile democracy and electoral system, nearly eliminating all high-level corruption in the small country.
Some key figures worth noting are:
- EU Funding: $30B allocated between 2014-2030
- Unemployment rate decreased from 11.1% (2017) to 6.6% (2019)
- Export Growth: 9.3% increase in 2017
- GDP Growth: 3.4% growth in 2019
For a small country that subsisted on Adriatic fishing and small-scale tourism, the impact that joining the EU has had on the country cannot be overstated. Moreover, the EU completely dissolved any sense of conflict between Croatia and Slovenia.
However, accepting some of the most impoverished nations in Europe into the EU would potentially continue to decrease the cost of labour across the union, furthering backlash from member states whose people are already suffering lower wages and a higher cost of living due to the EU migration policies and “human quantitative easing”. Furthermore, negotiating an agreement on border security, identity and the crimes of past wars will be a challenge for EU diplomats as they will face stubborn opposition from the hardliners of all the Balkan nations.
Of course, these concepts do not come without their issues. EU accession and integration is not straightforward. For Croatia there were issues that nearly derailed the accession, largely centred around Euroscepticism, corruption, and friction from other member states. The key issues EU policymakers must be aware of and address during serious accession talks are:
Kosovo is a region that self-proclaimed independence from Serbia in 2008, a decade after the Kosovo war. Serbia strongly denies any form of Kosovo independence, they back up this claim with the fact there was no official referendum and that Kosovo never existed as a historical state. Whilst 104 countries recognise Kosovo, many do not; including EU states such as Greece and Spain. Due to the lack of universal recognition Kosovo is not a UN recognised state. Further complicating the matter is the language and cultural difference, Albanian is completely different to Serbian and Kosovars do not associate themselves with a Serbian nor Slavic identity. It is highly unlikely Serbia will recognise any form of EU accession that includes an independent Kosovo.
- Bosnian ethnic sectarianism -
Bosnia is a nation that consists of 2 states (orthodox ethnic Serb Republika Srpska and the Islamic majority Bosniak Federacija) and has 3 official presidents. It is a near land-locked nation that is closest Europe has to a failed state. The majority of the country’s lithium mines are located in Republika Srpska. There is also the separatist movement, akin to the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, where Republika Srpska is looking to unify with Serbia.
- EU enlargement and the anti-immigration shift -
The EU has been shifting politically right, with a hard-line anti-immigration, anti-enlargement agenda. Whilst Balkan accession would benefit the EU by reducing the need of non-European workers, many domestic policy makers would fight against further enlargement. Accepting some of the most impoverished nations in Europe into the EU would potentially continue to decrease the cost of labour across the union, furthering backlash from member states whose people are already suffering lower wages and a higher cost of living due to the EU migration policies and “human quantitative easing”. Both Orban’s PfE and Le Pen’s ID party are against any enlargement.
- Macedonia-Greece nomenclature
This is by far the easiest issue to resolve. Since 1992 there have been constant disputes with the name of Macedonia or North Macedonia. Whilst it was resolved in 2018, it is expected Greece will try and use EU accession for leverage on changing the name further.
These issues, whilst difficult to resolve, are not impossibleThe economic and political leverage of the EU and their use of advisors, diplomats and bureaucrats should be able to draft an agreement amicable to all. Our analysts at Geocapita propose the following policy concepts to be explored in order to accelerate accession and negate the potential of conflict efficiently:
- Clear accession pathways - prioritise Balkan entry.
- Strengthen Cross-border cooperation - via joint infrastructure projects, and cultural heritage initiatives (these can include the expansion of ERASMUS) and inter-cultural trips.
- Economic Integration - convince Balkan policy makers to adopt the Euro, with the incentive of increasing pre-accession funding and expanding TAIEX.
In conclusion, whilst the EU is currently undergoing many internal political shifts, the outlook on Balkan accession should not. Both a centrist and far-right EU can benefit from Balkan accession, specifically on increasing cohesion, reaffirming European identity, reducing the Sino-Russian sphere of influence in Serbia and aiding human capital easing. On a more abstract level, the ability to prevent a future Balkan war would send shockwaves on the geostrategic landscape, proving that the EU is one step closer to being proactive as a super-state which can stand on its own in an increasingly multipolar world.
