North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has long been an outlier in the global international order, a fact which was exacerbated by the fall of the Soviet Union. For a long time the DPRK has been the epitome of the “Rogue State”, an international oddity closed off to the world and heavily sanctioned. However, the global shift from the US led unipolar world order towards multipolarity has opened up a unique opportunity for the DPRK to reengage with the international community, as a highly militarised, resource rich and unpredictable entity which could potentially act as the first nuclear proxy - allowing it to potentially play the role of the Houthis of the Pacific with little to no repercussions.
This article examines the capabilities and motives of the DPRK to disrupt trade and relations within the Asia-Pacific region through military and civilian engagements while also evaluating the cost-benefit analysis for the DPRK and the likelihood of the scenario.
*AUTHORS NOTE*: Throughout the research process for this article I found many unsubstantiated claims from various so-called prestigious academic journals and media outlets particularly pertaining to the internal situation and foreign policy aims of both the Houthis and DPRK. As a result when I make a reference to the aims of a country I make sure to reference an official source from said country. This is done as a commitment to objectivity and against propagandisation of so-called “academic” media.
Despite having been sanctioned by the US since the 1950s, the DPRK cemented its “rogue state status” after conducting its first nuclear test in 2006 which resulted in the United Nations Security Council imposing sanctions upon the nation. Initially, sanctions were focused on trade bans on weapons-related materials and goods but this did little to deter Pyongyang and thus tests continued in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017. Following these tests sanctions were expanded to luxury goods to target the elites, targeting of financial assets overseas, banking transactions, and general travel and trade. These sanctions effectively cut off the DPRK from the world and furthered the economic disparity between the North and South of the Korean peninsula, a fact which was painful to the old guard of the DPRK who remember prior to 1977 when the GDP of the North exceeded the South.
The reasons for the DPRK’s desire for a nuclear weapons program far exceed the cartoonishly villainous portrayal of the North Korean leadership’s desire for the complete destruction of the United States and South Korea. While on paper the DPRK was protected by China, the normalisation of relations between China and former ally Russia with the US and its Unipolar western order during the 90s and early 2000s certainly worried the leadership in Pyongyang who could not compete with the value propositions the United States was providing. This uncertain future combined with the toppling of perceived “hostile regimes” by the US globally, many of which were nominally allies of China and Russia, undoubtedly resulted in the conclusion that the DPRK needed nuclear weapons to not only survive but thrive as a global power that would be taken seriously due to its nuclear bargaining power. The fall of regimes such as Saddam Hussein’s in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi’s in Libya after they pursuing abandoned weapons of mass destruction likely reinforced Pyongyang's belief that nuclear arms are essential for survival as toppling only took place once the US had confirmed they were not in their possession. Similarly the survival of Iran’s regime can also be attributed to the ambiguity over their possession of nuclear weapons, despite them frequently being branded as “the largest state sponsor of terror”.
When you evaluate the other options the Kim dynasty had to hold onto power, the options were few. Principally the foundational ideology of the DPRK “Juche”, literally translating to “self-reliance”, rendered opening up as contradictory while also increasing the possibility of subversion from the US in order to overthrow the Kims. Contrary to popular belief, the decision making of the Kim dynasty, particularly under Kim Jong Un, are not cartoonish buffornery but rather highly calculated as they strategically play into the role handed to them by the international community as the “rogue state”. Orchestrating cyberattacks, heists, cryptocurrency scams and foreign assassinations, the DPRK seemingly is not concerned about the redlines of hostile foreign powers and plays the role of the cornered fox, employing bandit economy tactics to further their own ambitions and goals. The development of a highly effective and capable nuclear program that would make their adversaries truly fear them becomes the magnus opus of allowing them to carry out such methods to a greater extent.
This nuclear buildup has culminated thus far in the development of the Hwasong-8, a ballistic missile mounted with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle with nuclear capabilities. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) are advanced aerospace weapon systems capable of flying at hypersonic speeds (Mach 5 or higher) while maintaining hyper maneuverability. Unlike traditional ballistic missiles that follow a predictable parabolic trajectory, HGVs "glide" through the Earth's atmosphere, making them hard to detect and near impossible to intercept. While the concept was developed during the Cold War, due to lack of capabilities the first operational HGV was unable to be deployed until 2019 with the Russian Avangard system followed by China's DF-ZF in 2020. Currently these are the only two confirmed operational systems deployed globally, with the United States self-reportedly lagging behind with HGV systems undergoing testing and final development. Despite the world’s strongest military claiming not to possess an operational HGV as of January 2025, the DPRK supposedly have had a hypersonic glide vehicle since 2021 developed in collaboration with the Russians and Chinese - the Hwasong-8. The United States also claims it does not as of yet have a tested means of countering HGVs, something which was reinforced by its reactions to the use of an Oreshnik hypersonic missile by Russia against Ukraine on 21 November 2024. If we are to assume that the United States and DPRK’s claims are true, it would mean that North Korea has a nuclear payload delivery superior to the United States which cannot be countered. This dynamic leaves the DPRK as one of only three world powers which could feasibly carry out a nuclear strike on the United States - the other two being China and Russia, largely perceived as the two greatest threats to the United States globally.
It must be noted however that the United States is likely not forthcoming about its nuclear arsenal and interception capabilities, with some suggesting that the United States’ recent investments in Next-Generation Interception (NGI) and THAAD systems are more sophisticated than publicly disclosed. The US also claims to have its Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also known as Dark Eagle, operational, with further testing continuing being conducted with the US army. Neither of these systems have been evidenced to be effective nor operational and there is a likelihood that the US has fallen behind the Russians and Chinese in the development of hypersonic technology, a fact which severely impacts the perception of the United States internationally.
In contrast, the Japanese have confirmed from observing a DPRK test launch that the Hwasong-8 is indeed a hypersonic missile as claimed by Pyongyang. This means the DPRK has the confirmed ability to carry out an uncontested hypersonic strike on Seoul, Tokyo, Okinawa and even as far as the US military installations in Guam. The DPRK also has intercontinental ballistic missiles which could hit the US mainland directly which could also be fitted with HGVs to prevent interception from American air defence which would make them capable of striking major US cities including Los Angeles, New York and even Washington DC. The other countries with the demonstrated capability to hit the US mainland are primarily Russia and China. Others, such as France, the UK, and potentially India and Israel, possess theoretical or secondary capabilities but lack the intent or strategic rationale to target the US. This leaves North Korea as the only “rogue state” with this capability and the only state with the capability which doesn’t have a trade or diplomatic relationship with the United States.
The most important factor of the DPRK’s HGV program is how a country ranked 142nd Gross GDP was able to produce one before the ranked 1 country, the United States. The answer certainly lies with China and Russia. The Hwasong-8’s HGV is almost identical to China’s DF-ZF HGV and analysts are certain it was developed with the aid of China. This begs the question as to why they have decided to do this?
The evidence suggests the possibility of creating a nuclear powered scapegoat which has the ability to disrupt and strike China's enemies in the region in a manner similar to that of the role of the Houthis in the context of Iranian foreign policy.
The mere threat of nuclear escalation has already evidenced it can paralyze decision-making. The limited western response in Ukraine and the gloves on approach to Iran in the Middle East clearly evidence the power of the strategic ambiguity of nuclear escalation. The DPRK has been privileged to the same treatment, being allowed to conduct missile tests dangerously close to major US allies with zero direct intervention. This has set a precedent and began to condition the minds of policy makers and the general public into an “outrage fatigue” over the actions of the DPRK. These periods of outrage and action continue to be shorter and less proportional as of late with the events in Gaza, Ukraine and the Red Sea demonstrating that the appetite for all-out-war and direct intervention has diminished significantly by both the public and decision makers, evidenced by the success of Trump’s anti-intervention election campaign in 2024. Nuclear capability is a distinct advantage the DPRK has over the Houthis who have very little recourse beyond conventional strikes against civilian and military targets in response to disproportionate retaliation capabilities of their enemies. This allows the DPRK to push the boundaries of disruption to a greater extent without being crippled by significant US strikes as seen in the recent bombings of the Houthis under Trump.
Alongside its nuclear arsenal the DPRK boasts a significant amount of conventional weapons, suitable for waging both a land war and carrying out short to mid range aerial strikes. By manpower the DPRK is the 4th largest military in the world with 1.3 million people and thousands of tanks, artillery and aircraft. While much of its equipment is outdated, the effectiveness of older weaponry for resistance and asymmetric warfare has been clearly evidenced throughout the war on terror and also the war in Ukraine. This arsenal when compared to that of the Houthis is significantly greater and more diverse in capabilities.
To compare, the Houthi military has an estimated manpower around 350,000, 26.9% of the size of the DPRK’s and only has a few hundred tanks, artillery pieces and armoured vehicles as well as a single F5 jet, a number which has likely dropped significantly since recent joint US and Israeli strikes. However the main source of the Houthi’s disruption and strength stems from its missiles and UAVs, most of which is supplied by Iran. By estimates, this arsenal includes hundreds of short to medium range ballistic missiles ,primarily based on Scud and Burkan platforms, thousands of suicide drones based upon iranian Shaheds as well as their own domestic variants, and a few dozen cruise missiles most similar to the Russian P-21s. With this arsenal they have been able to almost render the Suez canal being useless via the targeting of trade ships linked to Israel and its allies has cost the global economy $200 billion already as well as totally embarrassed the US and its allies’ strength in the region.
To compare, it is estimated the DPRK has the fourth largest missile stockpile in the world, just above the Houthi’s main supplier Iran with around 2000 ballistic missiles ranging from SRBM to ICBM. They are also estimated to be ranked 7th in the world when it comes to drone stockpiles with this undoubtedly being an area of increased focus as evidenced by the recent unveiling of the new “AI suicide drone”. During the unveiling Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un stated "The field of unmanned equipment and artificial intelligence should be top-prioritized and developed in modernizing the armed forces” and also officially unveiled an airborne early-warning aircraft for the first time, a capability that could improve its aging air defence systems. It is clear the DPRK has one of the largest and rapidly advancing missile and drone stockpiles in the world, several times larger than the Houthis making them far more capable of disruption.
It is also worth taking into consideration the domestic manufacturing and resource capabilities of both the Houthis and the DPRK. The Houthis have several subterranean and guerilla manufacturing capabilities, however this is small scale and dependent on Iran. Yemen lacks natural resources and agricultural products making food supplies, energy and medicine scarce, something only exacerbated by conflict. The result is the Houthis can output domestically produced drones and missiles but only to a limited extent. To contrast, the DPRK has a significant industry, with over 200 ammunition factories alone. The DPRK is far more rich in natural resources than its southern counterpart and exports coal, iron ore, rare earth metals (despite sanctions) and also has significant uranium deposits for nuclear program. The DPRK is supplying Russia with various calibres of artillery shells including 155mm and it is estimated that their production could exceed 6 million shells a year.
Despite over a decade of bombardment and operations against them by the US backed Saudi coalition, it is widely considered that the Houthis have “won” the conflict, largely due to their defensive mountainous terrain, ideological zealotry and being well supplied via domestic manufacturing and Iran. This reality closely mirrors the situation the DPRK finds itself in. Yemen is around 70% mountainous while the DPRK is 80%, with both being heavily fortified and prepared for armed struggle domestically. The DPRK has one of the most ideologically zealous populations in the world and has a much stronger domestic manufacturing and resources sector to supply its military while also having a more advanced ally than Iran in China.
The only outlet in which considerable damage is being enacted upon the Houthis is with aerial strikes, an area they cannot retaliate with on the same magnitude. With a nuclear deterrent in their arsenal this may be a different case as seen with the US’ initial reluctance to allow strikes into Russia by Ukraine. The DPRK’s status as a rogue state and brazen disregard for international law as evidenced by the assassination of Kim Jong Nam, the recent $1.5bn cyberheist and frequent illegal weapons tests, makes them a more feared and arbitrary adversary, resulting in them being treated with greater caution when it comes to nuclear escalation.
The reality of conflict with the DPRK is an unwinnable conflict for any who engage with it. The Kim dynasty has had 75 years to prepare for war with the United States, ingraining the ideology of Juche (self-reliance) into their society and building defensive and offensive capabilities. The continuation of one goal and vision across three generations is unique in modern geopolitics and has resulted in the outcome we see currently - the DPRK is estimated to have thousands of underground military installations, including bunkers and command centers making a land invasion and occupation almost impossible. The ideological zealotry of their 26 million people combined with almost a century of ceaseless preparation and a leading nuclear program makes them impossible to invade.
This situation gives the DPRK an ability to disrupt the region in any way it desires with little or no consequences militarily. The nation is already sanctioned resulting in a resilient and self-sufficient internal economy and a people used to living according to their needs and not their wants. With their significant missile and drone stockpile, the DPRK could hypothetically target trade ships, military targets and key infrastructure in the region with limited consequences due to its nuclear defensive capabilities being able to potentially strike the US directly.
If the DPRK was to take upon the role of the “Houthis of the Pacific”, who and what the DPRK decided to target could depend on numerous factors.
Assuming the construction of a hypersonic glide vehicle with the help of China was preparing the DPRK for this role, we can assume that the primary target would be Taiwan. The end of separatism and rival claims to being the rightful government of China in Taiwan has been a primary foreign policy goal since the inception of the People’s Republic of China. This goal could have been achieved in the 1950s as Mao’s armies began sweeping through the remnant warlord states and reclaiming former Chinese territory lost and splintered during the “Century of Humiliation” however was unable to due to the start of the Korean war. Prior to the Korean war, the US had little to no interest in intervening in China following World War 2, both sides were seen as corrupt dictatorships by the US and the focus was primarily on Europe and the occupied Japan. The start of the Korean War however reinforced and expanded the scope of the Truman doctrine of containing communism and resulted in the US taking an energetic stance against Communist China who was backing the DPRK against the ROK who was their ally.
As a result of the Chinese support of the DPRK, Truman made a commitment to Taiwan as a bulwark against the spread of Communism into Asia and deployed troops there. Thus, even as Mao's armies were working out the logistics of how to stage the maritime invasion of Taiwan, Truman ordered the US Seventh Fleet to take up stations in the Taiwan Strait, directly between Taiwan and the Communist forces across the water in mainland China.
The US conviction to defend Taiwan was reinforced by China's decision to direct intervention in the Korean War in October 1950 which placed China as a belligerent state opposed to the national security interests of the USA and its allies akin to the Soviet Union. Thus any state threatened by China became a prospective US ally to be brought under the shield of the Truman Doctrine and containment. This has remained the status quo ever since. This historical tie between both nations being unable to reclaim their territory from US backed rival regimes creates common purpose and incentive for military cooperation as well as a certain “debt” the DPRK owes China for its vital support which has allowed the continued independence of its nation.
Replicating the Houthi strategy, where China would take the role of Iran, the DPRK could begin striking military and trade targets in and around Taiwan. These strikes could be primarily carried out using its ballistic missile and drone arsenal similar to that of the Houthis to target shipping lanes vital to Taiwan, destroying cargo ships and creating no-go-zones for shipping companies. Similarly, while the DPRK lacks a blue-water navy, it has swarms of fast attack boats, mini-submarines, and maritime drones that could be used for harassment operations in the Taiwan Strait. It could mine shipping lanes or deploy unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to disrupt commercial traffic, indirectly supporting a Chinese blockade.
Taiwan relies on foreign imports for 97% of its energy needs and around 70% of its food needs and raids on cargo ships importing these vital resources into Taiwan could starve the island, crash the economy and cause civil unrest which would push Taiwan to the negotiation table. Taiwan produces over 60% of the world's semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced ones meaning a blockade would have massive international implications particularly for the US, South Korea, Japan and Europe who rely heavily on the Taiwanese imported semiconductors for their own manufacturing industries which make up a significant portion of their export economy. This would weaken all US allies, particularly the ROK which would provide the DPRK with greater leverage for a possible future confrontation with them.
Due to the nuclear threat the DPRK poses, in response the US could do very little other than supply Taiwan with anti missile/drone and maritime defense systems of which it has a shortage due to recently supplying Ukraine and Israel heavily to repel similar attacks. The risk posed by conventional strikes on the DPRK would be too significant and the US would be at the mercy of China and Russia to persuade the DPRK to desist. This provide a potential opportunity for favourable negotiations regarding ceasing support for Taiwan and Ukraine alike in order to preserve US interests at home and save face internationally.
There are limitations to the likelihood of this outcome however, namely from China itself. China’s four largest trading partners are the US, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. China relies massively on exports to these nations to prop up its growing economy and a conflict being risked with all of them would come at a significant cost economically. The targeting of trade ships in the South China Sea would increase freight costs to and from China significantly making them a less competitive supplier on the international market generally also. The risk of this could be disastrous to Beijing at this time as China is under economic pressure due to a housing crisis and economic slowdown. The timing diplomatically for this Houthi strategy to take place would be poor also as South Korea and Japan are being pushed towards China and strengthening ties in response to tariffs and hostility from the Trump Administration. Similarly, DPRK and Chinese ally Russia would likely object due to potential issues it could cause for their largest Pacific port Vladivostok which sits only 160km from the DPRK’s border.
Trade aside, involving a foreign power in its dispute on Taiwanese separatism would turn the conflict from an “internal issue” as Beijing has framed it since the 50s, to one of international interventionism, potentially compromising the One China Policy. China still views the Taiwanese people as its citizens and attacks from a foreign power could be viewed as an act of war against them and would break the social contract of a government’s role to protect its people, once again weakening China’s claim to Taiwan.
Ultimately China’s foreign policy goal and attitude has always been that of “preserving the middle kingdom” above all else. Its history of disastrous external wars resulting in mass internal unrest, civil war, famine and economic collapse has made the Chinese government focus on internal preservation over foreign expansionism. This can be seen through the Chinese government’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence” which are:
- Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
- Mutual non-aggression
- Non- interference in each other's internal affairs
- Equality and mutual benefit
- Peaceful coexistence
And while Taiwan does fall under “internal affairs”, Beijing is shrewd enough to understand the implications of hostile military conduct against them.
However, utilisation of this asymmetric Houthi-style approach may not be limited as to acting upon the behalf of a foreign power, Pyongyang through its Juche principles is more than capable and willing to exert its influence for its own foreign policy aims independently, disregarding the opinion of its allies. During his 2017 New Years Eve Speech, Kim Jong Un stated he views the US as a country "occupying South Korea and tries to realize the strategy for achieving hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region." and the DPRK must “put an end to the moves” through and “wage a dynamic pan-national struggle to thwart the moves of the traitorous and sycophantic anti-reunification forces”. He further elaborated on October 17th 2024 in a DPRK state media KCNA report that "reunification was no longer possible” and that South Korea was a “hostile state”. The DPRK’s primary foreign goal appears to be reclaiming the south via military means and secondarily diminishing US influence in the Asia-Pacific region.
The DPRK already has a history of disruptive hostile actions towards the Republic of Korea, most recently with the frequent “trash balloons” being flown over the border and into Seoul. Should there be an opportunity or policy shift it is more than feasible that this disruption would expand in scope to trade interdiction. The Republic of Korea is an export based economy with 88% of its GDP being made up from trade and also relies upon imports for 98% of its fossil fuel energy needs and 70% of its agricultural and food products. This makes the South Korean economy extremely vulnerable to Houthi-like trade disruptions which could grind the ROK economy to a halt as well as starve them of energy and food. Assuming a lack of successful support, this would undoubtedly allow the DPRK to demoralise, isolate and cripple the ROK within a short time period, forcing the ROK to act militarily in response resulting in a more favourable conflict narrative for the DPRK and likely resulting in the eventual capitulation of the ROK.
In order to attack and disrupt US capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, the DPRK has the capability to disrupt the Straits of Malacca - the world’s busiest trade route. This could manifest itself in numerous ways from the aforementioned missile tests to supporting piracy and utilising cyber attacks. Pyongyang has used criminal networks for smuggling in the past; expanding to piracy to hijack ships, increasing insurance costs and forcing naval patrols, is certainly feasible. A cyberattack could cripple Singapore’s PSA International and Malaysia’s Port Klang which are critical hubs for trade passing through the Straits. A cyberattack could freeze cargo handling for days, as demonstrated by the 2018 Maersk cyber attack which resulted in over $300M+ in damages. Alternatively the DPRK could even slow trade through the straits through evading sanctions in the region, forcing inspections. The outcomes of the DPRK disrupting trade through Mallacca would be higher than that of the disruption caused by the Houthis through the Suez and would cost estimated $64.5 million in additional shipping costs per week, with longer-term disruptions having significant economic consequences.
Alternatively we could see attacks on US military bases in Asia similar to attacks by jihadists on US bases in Syria, Iraq and Jordan. US responses could be limited by the aforementioned nuclear risk but the risk factor is significantly higher. Bases in South Korea, Japan, Philippines and other Pacific islands could be targeted in this option. However under a Trump presidency it is highly unlikely there would not be significant retaliation for this despite the risks to the US.
All these suppositions however predicate upon the DPRK opting to play a Houthi-like role and push the boundaries of geopolitical tensions, and more importantly if it is allowed to. As mentioned previously, any disruption in the region by the DPRK would primarily impact its main ally, China, increasing shipping costs, increasing tensions and having mass economic fallout. In addition to this, Russia’s main pacific port Vladivostok sits only 160km from the DRPK’s borders and would significantly be impacted by escalations on the Korean peninsula. The DPRK would likely completely isolate itself from the international community and become a victim of a coalition in the same way the world cooperated against the Islamic State despite geopolitical and ideological differences.
All of this assumes however that the DPRK wishes to act out militarily. Despite sensationalised media reports, Pyongyang hasn’t carried out any attacks at scale since the end of the Korean war, with border skirmishes and diplomatic incidents for smuggling and assassinations being the greatest extent of this. Kim Jong Un and the DPRK’s constitution affirm that their nuclearisation has been entirely for deterrence and self defence purposes where it has clearly been successful thus far. While missile tests have certainly provoked scrutiny and fear in its neighbours, the DPRK is simply flexing its military might in order to deter potential transgressions against it. Up until October 2024, peaceful reunification was always the main agenda for the issue of South Korea for Pyongyang and it did see historical success as seen in the now defunct Kaesong joint industrial region.
Currently the DPRK is enjoying the benefits of newfound trade and cooperation with newly diplomatically isolated Russia and is certainly reaping the benefits. As the world transitions from US centred unipolarity and towards a multipolar world order, further opportunities will open for the resources rich and labour cheap DPRK to increase its influence, grow its economy and legitimise itself as the rightful government of the Korean peninsula. Unless there was a significant shift in global relations with a major global conflict between China and the US for example, it is highly unlikely for the DPRK to assume a Houthi-like role in the pacific any time soon. That being said however it is important to recognise their capability to disrupt and damage US influence in the region with no clear and easy path of recourse for Washington. This positioning has been intentionally crafted by the Kim Dynasty and just now are we seeing the DPRK begin to exert itself on the foreign stage again, situations change rapidly and North Korea should not be viewed as some crackpot nation incapable of standing up to the might of the US. The Houthis have demonstrated the power of an asymmetric and ideologically zealous force and decision makers would be foolish to not take into account the Pyongyang factor when making moves in the Asia-Pacific region.
If the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were to adopt asymmetric maritime warfare tactics—similar to the Houthis in the Red Sea—it could disrupt global trade, threaten regional security, and escalate military tensions in Northeast Asia. Such actions might include:
- Missile and drone attacks on commercial shipping
- Naval mining of key chokepoints (e.g., Korea Strait, Tsushima Strait)
- Harassment and seizure of vessels (state-sponsored piracy)
- Blockades or quasi-blockades targeting South Korea, Japan, or U.S. forces
- Cyberattacks on port and shipping infrastructure
To prevent and mitigate this threat, policymakers must adopt a multi-layered strategy combining deterrence, defense, diplomacy, and economic pressure. Below is an expanded and enhanced set of recommendations for key stakeholders.
1. United States & Core Allies (South Korea, Japan, Australia)
A. Military & Security Measures
Expand Naval & Aerial Patrols:
- Deploy additional U.S. Navy destroyers, submarines, and P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft to monitor North Korean movements.
- Strengthen Japan-South Korea-US trilateral maritime patrols to ensure freedom of navigation.
- Establish a "Pacific Maritime Security Task Force" (with Australia, UK, Canada) to counter DPRK threats.
Enhanced Missile & Drone Defense:
- Increase Aegis-equipped ships and THAAD batteries in South Korea and Japan.
- Develop directed-energy weapons (lasers) and electronic warfare systems to counter drone swarms.
- Pre-deploy mine-countermeasure (MCM) ships near key straits.
Preemptive Strike Options:
- If North Korea begins mining international waters or firing missiles at ships, authorize kinetic strikes on launch sites and naval bases (escalation being considered).
- Conduct show-of-force exercises (e.g., B-1B bomber flyovers, carrier strike group deployments).
B. Intelligence & Surveillance Upgrades
Real-time satellite & UAV tracking of North Korean naval movements.
AI-driven threat detection to identify suspicious ship behavior (e.g., mine-laying, missile prep).
Expanded SIGINT (signals intelligence) to intercept DPRK naval communications.
C. Economic & Diplomatic Pressure
Tighten Sanctions Enforcement:
- Crack down on illicit ship-to-ship transfers (oil, coal) via satellite tracking and naval interdiction.
- Secondary sanctions on Chinese/Russian entities aiding DPRK’s maritime aggression.
Diplomatic Isolation:
- Push for UNSC emergency sessions to condemn North Korean actions.
- Encourage ASEAN and African nations to cut ties with Pyongyang if it disrupts global trade.
2. South Korea’s Specific Actions
A. Naval & Coast Guard Expansion
- Acquire more frigates, submarines, and anti-mine ships.
- Develop Unmanned Surface and Subsurface Vehicles ("sea drones") for reconnaissance and strike missions against DPRK vessels.
- Conduct live-fire drills simulating defense against naval blockades.
B. Port & Supply Chain Resilience
- Harden critical ports (Busan, Incheon) against missile/drone attacks.
- Stockpile emergency fuel and food supplies in case of temporary trade disruptions.
C. Psychological & Information Warfare
- Broadcast warnings to DPRK sailors defying orders to attack ships.
- Offer defection incentives for North Korean naval personnel.
3. Japan’s Countermeasures
A. Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Upgrades
- Deploy more destroyers near the Tsushima and Korea Straits.
- Accelerate missile defense upgrades (e.g., SM-6, Type 03 Chū-SAM upgrades).
B. Civilian Shipping Protection
- Arm commercial vessels with anti-drone systems.
- Provide naval escorts for high-value cargo (LNG tankers, semiconductor shipments).
C. Energy Security
- Diversify oil/gas imports away from Middle East routes vulnerable to DPRK interference.
- Increase LNG reserves to mitigate supply shocks.
4. China’s Role – Restrain or Enable?
If Cooperative:
- Pressure Pyongyang diplomatically (cutting oil supplies, restricting trade).
- Join UN-led interdiction efforts against DPRK smuggling.
If Uncooperative:
- Impose secondary sanctions on Chinese firms aiding DPRK’s naval aggression.
- Increase U.S. naval patrols near China’s EEZ to deter collusion.
5. ASEAN & Regional Partners (Philippines, Vietnam, India, etc.)
- Join freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea to deter spillover threats.
- Enhance coast guard cooperation to track suspicious DPRK vessels.
- Avoid recognizing any DPRK "blockade" as legitimate.
6. United Nations & International Bodies
- Emergency UNSC resolutions authorizing naval interdiction of DPRK threats.
- ICC prosecutions for DPRK officials ordering attacks on civilian ships.
- Global shipping insurers (e.g., Lloyd’s) to deny coverage for DPRK-linked vessels.
7. Private Sector & Commercial Shipping
- Reroute vessels away from high-risk zones (if DPRK mines straits).
- Invest in anti-drone jammers and armed security teams for ships.
- Use blockchain-based tracking to avoid DPRK spoofing/AIS manipulation.
In conclusion, while the likelihood of the DPRK becoming the "Houthis of the Pacific" is currently low, it is certainly capable of doing so at an unprecedented level due to its nuclearisation. In order to prevent the scenario the U.S. and allies must:
- Deter through overwhelming naval dominance.
- Defend with layered missile/drone shields.
- Disrupt DPRK funding via sanctions.
- Diplomatically isolate Pyongyang while engaging China.
It is essential to remember that a weak or delayed response would only embolden Pyongyang, leading to a prolonged crisis. Preemptive planning is essential. The geopolitical situation for Pyongyang could change rapidly as we’ve seen the trend internationally in the last few years and it hasn’t prepared itself and been aided in building a tier 1 nuclear program by China and Russia for no reason. The Kim dynasty has always played the long game and has outlived the Soviet Union itself, it is likely with shrewd planning it could continue to not only live but begin to thrive in the new multipolar world.
