The terror attack in Pahalgram in the Indian state of Kashmir on Tuesday has resparked the almost century-old conflict between India and Pakistan. Ever since decolonisation we have seen four major wars between the two nations over territorial disputes, primarily regarding the areas in and surrounding Kashmir which has resulted in the Indian-Pakistan border being one of the most militarized international boundaries in the world. However, these rising tensions and the subsequent threat of conflict have highlighted a key trend in geopolitics - the threat of a resource war. In this article, we will explore the possibility of a resource war in South Asia due to these rising tensions and its potential impacts on the region and the general shift towards multipolarity.
The events following the terror attack on 22nd April 2025 have marked a clear diplomatic and military escalation between the already longstanding rivals of India and Pakistan. The attack was carried out by “The Resistance Front” a Kashmir-focused offshoot of the UN-recognised and Al-Qaeda-funded Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani organization whose primary stated objective is to merge the whole of Kashmir with Pakistan. Since 2019 the legal status of Kashmir has changed within India which has resulted in less autonomy, greater numbers of Hindu migration, and demographic change and inflamed the already ongoing four-decade-long insurgency. This has provoked an increased hostility between the two countries, with many in Pakistan seeing India’s ruling BJP “Hindutva” government as an expansionist, supremacist, and belligerent oppressor who is opposed to Pakistan and Islam.
Following the attack Pakistan sent its condolences and condemned the attack along with all of India’s other neighbours and most other nations worldwide, the stark difference was, however, the denial of Pakistani involvement in supporting/organising the attack, with their defence minister claiming the attack was “home-grown’ in India. Despite this initial olive branch, the Indian foreign secretary Vikram Misri held a special press briefing after a meeting with the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security (CSS). He announced India’s decision to temporarily suspend the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan with immediate effect until Pakistan “ceases its support for cross-border terrorism” along with announcing the closure of the integrated check post at the Attari–Wagah Border, a travel ban for all Pakistani nationals to India under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme, and cancellation of all previously issued visas. In addition to this, military and diplomatic missions between the two countries have been largely expelled or recalled in a marked breakdown of diplomacy.
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is a water-distribution treaty signed between India and Pakistan in 1960 which was arranged and negotiated by the World Bank, to use the water available in the Indus River and its tributaries. It divides the six major rivers of the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan:
- India controls the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej).
- Pakistan controls the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), though India can use them for limited non-consumptive purposes.
This results in India receiving about 30% of the total water carried by the Indus Rivers System, which is located in India, while Pakistan receives the remaining 70%.
80% of Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture depends on the Indus Basin along with 90% of its food production relies on Indus waters and 45% of Pakistan’s population works in agriculture making the flows from the Indus an issue of existential importance for the nation. In contrast, India’s water flow from the river does not even meet its agricultural requirements for the single state of Jammu and Kashmir due to it being limited by the treaty and is prevented from monopolising on the Indus Waters within its land due to the impact it would have downstream in Pakistan. Disputes arise when India builds dams (e.g., Baglihar, Kishenganga), which Pakistan claims violates the treaty due to it decreasing water flowing into Pakistan leading to potential disastrous economic and humanitarian impacts for the nation.
India has the geographic upper hand due upstream control of the Indus waters which allow it to influence water flow, but this has always been prevented by the treaty as it restricts major diversions. Pakistan has legal recourse via neutral experts/courts when India diverts the flow of the Indus water but remains vulnerable to India’s infrastructure projects.
In short, Pakistan is more dependent, but India holds more strategic leverage. The treaty has survived conflicts in the past but remains a flashpoint, with India threatening to similarly suspend the treaty in 2019 following the Pulwama terror attack also in the state of Jammu and Kashmir by another Islamist Pakistani terror group. At the time, the Union Minister for Water Resources and a senior leader in the BJP Nitin Gadkari said that all water flowing from India would be diverted to Indian states to punish Pakistan for an alleged connection to the attack, something which the Pakistani Government denied and condemned. Union Minister of State for Jal Shakti Rattan Lal Kataria said that “every effort is made“ to stop the flow of water downstream from the three assigned rivers, although ultimately very little changed.
In response to the threats made to suspend the treaty, Pakistan’s Minister of Power, Awais Leghari, called the decision “an act of water warfare; a cowardly, illegal move“ and went on to say “Every drop is ours by right, and we will defend it with full force — legally, politically, and globally.” Officials further stated that any action affecting water resources would be considered an act of war. On the 24th of April, Pakistan suspended visas issued to Indian nationals and closed its airspace to Indian aircraft, expelled Indian diplomats, instructed Indian military advisers to depart the country no later than the 30th of April and suspended the Simla Agreement, a peace treaty signed that ended the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.
Tensions are only increasing as of the time of writing this with military build-ups and skirmishes occurring between Pakistan and India between and around Kashmir. We could potentially be seeing the formation of the first “resource war” between two nuclear powers in the modern era, a trend long since predicted by geopolitical analysts in East and West.
The consequences of such a conflict could be catastrophic for both nations, as exemplified by Pakistan’s economic and agricultural dependence on the river for water flows. India and Pakistan both have diplomatic narratives to maintain as well as historical precedents and conflict-supportive populations which could certainly result in war if things continue to escalate. Currently, India would be seen as the aggressor with Pakistan having a righteous Casus Belli in the eyes of the international community due to the drastic impacts suspending the treaty would have on them. India’s recent military manoeuvres could be seen as an attempt to win back the narrative from Pakistan as they move their aircraft carriers and fleet towards the sea in which Pakistan has scheduled missile tests.
If India were to definitively suspend the treaty and begin to act in diverting water flow from Pakistan, Pakistan’s ally and supporter of their claim to Kashmir, China, may intervene as it looks to assert itself as a global superpower in the context of multipolarity. A likely scenario that China could enact is one of mirroring India’s disruption of water flows into Pakistan. China controls the headwaters of several major rivers flowing into India, including:
Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet) – Vital for Northeast India and Bangladesh.
Indus (originates in Tibet) – Though Pakistan is more dependent, its upper reaches are in China.
Sutlej (Langchen Khambab in Tibet) – Feeds northern India’s rivers.
China has built dams and diversion projects for example the Zangmu Dam on Brahmaputra and could potentially use them to store water or divert water to its arid north (via South-North Water Transfer Project) and thus reduce downstream flow or even release excess water causing floods in India.
The potential impacts on India if China Diverts Water are immense. Northeast India and Bangladesh could face complete agricultural collapse, drinking water shortages affecting millions, Hydropower losses with dams like Subansiri running dry, and could even provide China with an opportunity to assert its border disputes with India during the chaos. The China-India border dispute involves roughly 38,000 square kilometers in the western sector (Ladakh and Aksai Chin) and 90,000 square kilometers in the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh) and has been ongoing since 1962.
The likelihood of this occurring is made highly plausible due to India’s lack of a water-sharing treaty with China, and most of its critical rivers originate on territory China controls. That being said however it is more likely to be used as a threat to broker a peace agreement resulting in a diplomatic win for China against a US which is increasingly isolating and unreliable for global partners.
It is worth mentioning there are countermeasures to this on the Indian side such as monitoring of China’s dams via satellites/hydrological data, the building of alternate reservoirs (e.g., the Upper Siang hydropower project), and diplomatic pressure through engaging Bangladesh for joint negotiations as they would also be impacted by these water diversions. The bottom line is however that China holds strategic control, but outright diversion would spark major conflict, and while India is preparing but remains vulnerable. This makes a peaceful resolution to an India-Pakistan conflict in the context of potential consequences from China the most likely scenario.
As is always the case with China, trade must be taken into account also as both India and Pakistan rely on China for their critical trade. China is the largest import partner for both nations and Pakistan is a flagship part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China has invested over $60 billion in infrastructure in Pakistan with the new Deepwater Gwadar Port being built and operated by China, offering China access to the Arabian Sea. This matters in assessing both China’s vested interests in a stable Pakistan for BRI and securing their trade partners who maintain a huge trade surplus within a time of economic uncertainty in the context of Trump’s tariffs.
As of the time of posting, this situation continues to unfold and is being actively monitored by Geocapita analysts. We believe that ultimately, one of two outcomes is to occur:
- If the trend of escalation continues China will flex its diplomatic, trade and water leverage to end the conflict as a landmark achievement in Chinese foreign policy, displacing the US as a peacemaking force, embarrassing Trump who has been unable to end any conflict he promised prior to entering office.
- The conflict will not escalate due to the China being too strong of a persuasive factor in its ability to disrupt both nations economically, agriculturally and militarily during a time where increased regional cooperation via the format of BRICS and similar agreements is vital as the US begins to withdraw from the world.
Currently, the situation is too fluid to predict with any conviction beyond this, but we will continue to discuss any developing narratives as things progress.
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