“Every saucepan is a Spitfire” – was the slogan plastered over the UK in 1940, urging civilians to donate old scrap for the war effort. In reality, Spitfires were not able to be made from low-grade aluminium. However, it presents a strategic logic – the need to have a scrap reserve.
Eighty years later and the UK faces a different kind of vulnerability, one less visible but no less critical. With the shutting down of domestic steel foundries and an over-reliance on foreign imports, Britain has lost much of its metallurgical autonomy. In a future marked by great power competition, weak supply chains, and the growing reality of a high intensity conflict, this gap in domestic resilience is more than just an economic liability – it is a core strategic flaw.
This article argues that the UK needs to develop a national strategic stockpile of defence grade steel scrap – not saucepans. Whilst this initiative would have a multitude of knock-on benefits such as helping in the green transition and market support, this article will focus on scrap steel as a strategic buffer for defence manufacturing and rapid industrial mobilisation. In the next war, the UK cannot afford to find itself rich in rhetoric but poor in steel.
The UK’s Steel Deficit
For centuries, Britain’s global power rested not just on the strength of its ideas, but on the weight of its industry. It was the first nation in the world to industrialise, setting the pace for the modern age with coal, steel, and steam. From the ironclads of the Royal Navy to the railways stretched across India, Africa, and the Middle East, steel was the skeleton of the British Empire.
The UK is perhaps the first cautionary tale for the end-of-life cycle of post-industrialisation in a globalised economy. What was once seen as inevitable progress i.e. the offshoring of heavy industry and the liberalisation of trade etc; is now being re-evaluated in the return of protectionist geopolitics and supply chain fragility.
At its peak in 1875, Britain produced 40% of the world’s steel. By 2023, that figure had collapsed to just 0.3%, with the UK producing only 5.6 million tonnes of crude steel — its lowest output in over a decade. By contrast, China produced 1,019 Mt, and even European economies like Germany (35Mt) and Italy (24Mt) vastly outpaced British production. The UK now ranks 8th among EU steel producers — behind not just the major powers, but even Austria and Belgium.
This decline is structural, not cyclical. The UK’s remaining primary steel capacity is concentrated at two sites – Port Talbot and Scunthorpe – which together account for 76% of national production. Making matters worse is the fact that both plants are transitioning away from blast furnaces (which processes low quality iron into steel) towards electric arc furnaces (EAFs), which rely almost solely on high quality scrap iron and steel. This shift is due to high energy costs, red tape and the high carbon output making it unprofitable to operate in accordance with environmental laws.
The UK will no longer be able to produce virgin steel domestically. This is a national security deficit, in a high-intensity conflict or sanctions conflict the UK could find itself unable to:
- Manufacture heavy armour or warships at scale
- Repair damaged infrastructure
- Maintain a sustained defence-industrial output over time
The status quo is also economically unviable with a chronic trade imbalance; in 2023 the UK imported 5.5 Mt of steel and only exported 3.2 Mt leaving a £1.9 Million deficit. The majority of the scrap being exported to Turkey, in return buying manufactured goods. 70% of UK steel imports come from the EU, an overreliance on partners whose own industrial resilience may be tested in the same strategic shock.
Finally, employment figures also paint a similarly stark picture. In 1971, the start of British deindustrialisation, the steel industry supported 320,000 jobs. In 2022, that number has fallen to just 23,000 (excl. steel processing). The shift to EAFs may further reduce headcount, not due to inefficiency but due to the lack of available high quality steel scrap.
The UK's deindustrialisation was not the result of a single policy failure, but of a broader ideological commitment to free-market globalisation, where iindustrial resilience was traded for short-term efficiency and cheaper imports. Steelmaking, shipbuilding, and engineering were allowed to wither under the assumption that global supply chains and post-Cold War peace would endure indefinitely.
There is a solution. The UK does produce scrap - around 10 Mt a year – but exports over 80% of it, mostly to Turkey and India. Whilst not all of 10Mt of steel are defence-grade, the UK is effectively giving away a critical strategic resource whilst importing finished goods at a premium. This is unsustainable. As evidenced by the Trump tariffs and global sanctions, the world has turned to autarky and trade has become protectionist. The UK can no longer rely on the free-trade globalist model for its defence.
The UK can not realistically re-industrialise to pre-1970’s level of manufacturing in a timely manner due to high energy costs, lack of usable infrastructure, red tape and lack of an industrial workforce. However it can better utilise its current resources. By treating steel scrap as a strategic asset and not as waste, the UK can build its defence posture and industrial resilience.
Why Scrap Steel is Strategic
As seen above with the shutting of blast furnaces - it is evident that the UK has shifted away from virgin steel production. EAFs are not capable of creating enough heat to smelt ore into pig iron and then to steel, however they are able to melt down already existing scrap steel. The reality is that high-quality steel scrap will be the backbone of British steelmaking capacity. Whilst the UK’s inability to process iron ore is deeply concerning, there are benefits on relying on steel scrap:
- Steel Scrap is plentiful – The current annual UK rate of steel scrap production is 10 million Tons. Sourced from decommissioned military equipment, industrial sites etc.
- Graded Steel Scrap does not require refining, it can be rapidly repurposed, enabling fast-scale industrial mobilisation.
In the context of high-intensity warfare or a sanctions-driven supply shock, this speed matters. This is well demonstrated when in 2022, Ukrainian factories had to rapidly retool to produce armoured vehicles, drones, and spare parts — much of it using recycled steel from decommissioned infrastructure and damaged military equipment. A stockpile of sorted, defence-grade scrap would allow the UK to immediately produce critical components / armour for tanks, warships and infrastructure. Where traditional supply chains may falter under pressure, scrap is an onshore, fast-reacting buffer — a material hedge against both strategic delay and coercive leverage.
The Need for Steel in Post-Industrial Warfare
The process of industrialisation is complex – it depends on many factors such as cheap energy, available labour and raw materials. In a defence-industrial context, without steel the other factors are just potential. Steel is the enabler of defence manufacturing.
In any future high-intensity conflict, the speed at which a nation can (somewhat) re-industrialise will define its fighting power. The UK has significantly de-industrialised, with manufacturing only accounting for 8.6% of total UK economic output in 2024 - full-scale re-industrialisation is no longer realistic, especially when compared to industrial powerhouses such as China, India and Russia. However, the UK can still build strategic depth by maximising what industrial capacity it still has left.
As seen by the war in Ukraine, post-industrial warfare has 3 characteristics relevant to European resources:
- High – Low mixture of military capabilities – ‘Dumb’ artillery is just as important as precision guided munitions.
- High dependence on external partners for resource support.
- Relatively static, High attrition.
It is also important to mention that Ukraine pre-2022 was a major global steel producer and exporter – producing 24.2 Mt in 2016 - and maintained reserves of steel. This capacity has enabled Ukraine to sustain its defence over such the previous 3 years.
The UK, by contrast, has neither a reserve nor the facilities to rapidly scale up. Without a stockpile of defence-grade scrap steel, Britain risks finding itself at war with no material from which to build.
Sourcing Scrap Steel
The UK is a post-industrial country, and although the country lacks current industrial facilities, it does have plenty of aging disused industrial infrastructure that could be repurposed.
A strategic reserve could be sourced from the following:
- Decommissioned Military Equipment
Since February 2022, the UK has disposed of over 1,000 military vehicles and 48 aircraft through sales or auctions. These assets represent a substantial quantity of high-grade steel suitable for recycling into defence applications.
- Disused Industrial Infrastructure
Britain’s former manufacturing heartlands — the North, the Midlands, South Wales — are home to old rail stock, cranes, foundry skeletons, and steel bridges.
- Urban Demolition and Redevelopment Waste
Major infrastructure upgrades in cities generate large volumes of structural steel scrap. With minimal policy coordination and financial incentive, this material could be diverted into the strategic reserve.
- Maritime and Commercial Heavy Scrap
In 2024, 324 merchant ships were recycled globally, yielding approximately 4.6 million gross tonnes of material. While the UK contributes a portion to this figure, expanding domestic shipbreaking activities can provide substantial steel inputs. Facilities capable of decommissioning and recycling over 300,000 tons of ships and marine structures annually already exist within the UK.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
If the UK is serious about its own defence and about its industrial resilience, it needs to begin by treating steel – specifically scrap steel – as a strategic commodity. The current model of exporting over 80% of domestically sourced scrap is strategically reckless and short-sighted.
First, the UK should establish a national scrap steel reserve, managed under a joint MOD–BEIS Strategic Materials Directorate. This reserve should prioritise pre-sorted, high-grade scrap, suitable for defence applications such as armoured vehicles, naval hulls, artillery barrels, and heavy transport infrastructure. Material should be stored in secure, decentralised sites — ideally near EAF operators or major logistics nodes like Teesside and Scunthorpe.
- Strategic logic: In a high-intensity conflict, there will be no time to source, sort, transport, and process scrap from across the country. The ability to move steel from warehouse to furnace to front line must be measured in hours, not weeks. As seen in Ukraine, the ability to quickly rearm and repair with domestically available materials is vital.
Second, the UK must retain more of its scrap output domestically. In times of peace, this may require market incentives for processing firms and EAFs. In times of crisis, it may involve temporary export restrictions on specific grades of strategic scrap — a policy already adopted by countries like China and India.
- Strategic logic: In the early 2010s, China banned scrap steel exports entirely to ensure a secure supply for its growing EAF capacity — a policy it only relaxed under strict quality controls in 2021. India, facing surging domestic infrastructure and defence demand, has also restricted certain scrap exports and imposed higher import duties to preserve critical materials for national use.
Third, scrap stockpiling must be integrated into national defence planning. The UK does not have the luxury of time in a future war. It must plan not only for fighting but for sustaining — and that means aligning material availability with production timelines across the defence sector.
- Strategic logic: In sustained conflict, the limiting factor is materiel. During the Falklands War, the UK was able to project force 8,000 miles from home, but only because the necessary platforms and infrastructure already existed. Today, with leaner supply chains and stockpiles emptied from the Ukraine War, that same operation would take much longer to accomplish.
Finally, the government should commission a strategic audit of critical materials, including scrap steel, rare earths, copper, and aluminium. Without visibility on what resources are available, where they are, and how they can be mobilised.
- Strategic logic: You can’t surge what you can’t see. The UK needs a material intelligence baseline. An annual national audit should map the location, quantity, and quality of strategic materials; both in industrial circulation and potential recovery streams.
Steel will not win a war by itself; but without it, the UK cannot win at all.
