“Every saucepan is a Spitfire” – was the slogan plastered over the UK in 1940, urging civilians to donate old scrap for the war effort. In reality, Spitfires were not able to be made from low-grade aluminium. However, it presents a strategic logic – the need to have a scrap reserve.‍Eighty years later and the UK faces a different kind of vulnerability, one less visible but no less critical. With the shutting down of domestic steel foundries and an over-reliance on foreign imports, Britain has lost much of its metallurgical autonomy. In a future marked by great power competition, weak supply chains, and the growing reality of a high intensity conflict, this gap in domestic resilience is more than just an economic liability – it is a core strategic flaw.‍This article argues that the UK needs to develop a national strategic stockpile of defence grade steel scrap – not saucepans. Whilst this initiative would have a multitude of knock-on benefits such as helping in the green transition and market support, this article will focus on scrap steel as a strategic buffer for defence manufacturing and rapid industrial mobilisation. In the next war, the UK cannot afford to find itself rich in rhetoric but poor in steel.

North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has long been an outlier in the global international order, a fact which was exacerbated by the fall of the Soviet Union. For a long time the DPRK has been the epitome of the “Rogue State”, an international oddity closed off to the world and heavily sanctioned. However, the global shift from the US led unipolar world order towards multipolarity has opened up a unique opportunity for the DPRK to reengage with the international community, as a highly militarised, resource rich and unpredictable entity which could potentially act as the first nuclear proxy - allowing it to potentially play the role of the Houthis of the Pacific with little to no repercussions.‍ This article examines the capabilities and motives of the DPRK to disrupt trade and relations within the Asia-Pacific region through military and civilian engagements while also evaluating the cost-benefit analysis for the DPRK and the likelihood of the scenario.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) took the developing world by storm and its rivals by surprise. In just a decade, Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative expanded to 150 countries and surpassed 1 trillion dollars in cumulative engagement. Originally conceived as a means to export China’s domestic overcapacity in construction, the BRI has since evolved into a sprawling network of infrastructure projects, trade agreements, and financial partnerships. The initiative has successfully strengthened China’s global influence and positioned it as a formidable economic and diplomatic power. Today, China is no longer just an emerging power; it is regarded as a “near-peer soft power competitor” with the US. However, as the BRI enters its second decade, China’s approach is undergoing a major transformation. Faced with domestic economic challenges, Beijing is recalibrating its strategy, but this will only highlight deeper structural flaws within the initiative. Corruption scandals, project failures, and the growing cost of restructuring loans for partner nations have damaged Beijing’s reputation and placed an unsustainable burden on China’s already strained finances. Whilst Beijing remains committed to the BRI, its execution has shifted, creating opportunities for some nations but leaving others behind. This article examines how China is reshaping the BRI in response to domestic economic challenges. It will also assess China’s evolving role as a development partner, highlighting how its economic priorities impact its overseas commitments.

Zambia, already renowned for its rich copper reserves, possesses significant untapped uranium deposits that could position the country as a key player in the global nuclear economy. As European nations accelerate their nuclear expansion to reduce dependence on Russian energy and meet ambitious decarbonization targets, securing stable uranium supplies has become a strategic priority. This shift is exemplified by Italy, the Czech Republic, Sweden and the Netherlands, among others, pledging to expand nuclear power in March 2024. Not only by extending the life of existing reactors, but also by building new plants and investing in the development of new types of reactors, such as small modular reactors. This cooperation underscores the broader European effort to bolster energy security and ensure long-term access to nuclear fuel. With increasing interest from foreign investors, including European firms looking to diversify their supply chains. With increasing interest from foreign investors, the development of Zambia’s uranium sector offers a unique opportunity to diversify its economy, create jobs, and generate much-needed revenue. This article examines Zambia’s uranium potential, exploring how the country can unlock its benefits while mitigating the associated risks to ensure sustainable and inclusive development.

Until the 1990s the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) national security policy was traditionally conservative, focused primarily on state survival and territorial unity. However the invasion of Kuwait forced the UAE to reassess its vulnerabilities as a small state. Under the leadership of Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ), the son of Sheikh Zayed, the UAE has revamped its national security policy to one of ambition. Emirati national security policy was shifted to focus on self-sufficiency, economic diversification, containing threats such as the Axis of Resistance & Islamism, projecting regional influence and ensuring good relations with global powers by having them have a stake in Emirati security. However the last point has failed to fully guarantee the UAE's security, prompting a need for greater independence in defense.‍A new critical pillar of the UAE’s national security strategy centres around its creation of an indigenous military industrial complex (MIC). Anticipated to exceed $129 billion in cumulative defence investment within 3 years, this commitment underscores the UAE’s shift in strategic priorities in a quickly changing Gulf. Factors driving this transformation include the diminishing role of the U.S. as the Gulf’s security guarantor post-Arab Spring, the pivot away from hydrocarbons, and the rising threat of Iranian militias.‍Whilst the UAE has a long history of purchasing arms from larger powers, this trend has now begun to shift, with Emirati defence strategy now looking to create its own vertical domestic defence industry, including R&D, production and maintenance. By creating its own domestic military industrial complex (MIC), the UAE seeks to enhance resilience and safeguard its autonomy whilst bolstering its capacity projecting regional influence. ‍To achieve this, the UAE employs a variety of diverse strategies, from strategically hedging itself between the US, Russia and China, to securing its long-term knowledge capital via its upcoming academic sector. The UAE has begun to rapidly develop its newest domestic industry – defence. This article examines how the creation of an indigenous MIC is critical for its national security strategy by reducing the UAE’s and explores the key methods to facilitate this shift.‍

Discovered in 2022, Venus-1 is set to revolutionise Southern Africa’s energy landscape. As TotalEnergies’ most significant discovery in two decades, Venus-1 is the largest Sub-Saharan oil find in history at an estimated 1.5 to 2 billion barrels of oil. Following "very positive" results of appraisal drilling at the Venus-1 site, an offshore oil field located in Namibia’s Orange Basin, TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné asserted that his “priority is Namibia," underscoring Total’s strategic focus on the country's burgeoning oil and gas sector. With an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil reserves confirmed so far following subsequent explorations in the nation, commercial production is forecasted to begin as early as 2029. As a consequence, Namibia has catapulted to the forefront of Africa’s energy revolution and, based on firsthand observations in April 2024, has responded by rapidly accelerating infrastructure development to meet the growing demands of the oil and gas sector. However, questions remain about this resource-rich nation’s ability to harness her newfound oil wealth sustainably amidst global energy transition pressures, governance challenges, and the need to balance foreign investment with local economic empowerment. This article will examine and make recommendations to relevant stakeholders on how to effectively and equitably maximise the benefits of Namibia’s newfound oil deposits by navigating a path toward sustainable development, while minimizing the associated costs of dependency, ensuring the country does not succumb to the resource curse.